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In the event that a patient has lost their decision-making capacity due to illness or
injury, a surrogate is often appointed to do so on their behalf. Research has shown
that people take less risk when making treatment decisions for other people than they
do for themselves. This has been discussed as surrogates employing greater caution for
others given the accountability they are faced with. We tested the prediction that making
accountability salient reduces risk-taking for others relative to the self by manipulating
the information shown to participants while they made treatment choices. One group
was asked to focus on the consequences for the recipient’s family, another on the
legal implications of their decisions, and another was not given additional information.
Participants reduced their risk-taking for others compared to themselves, irrespective
of the condition they were in. Although participants in each condition reported thinking
about these factors to different extents, there were no clear differences in risk-taking
between groups. However, we did find that, across all participants, thinking about legal
consequences reduces risk-taking. We suggest that future research investigates how
the effect of thinking about accountability on surrogate choices is mediated by feelings
of accountability, in order to further examine the explanations suggested in the literature.
Keywords: surrogate decision-making, self-other differences, accountability, medical decision-making, DMfO
INTRODUCTION
Making decisions on behalf of someone else is not an easy task and often places a high level of
responsibility on the decision-maker, particularly in a medical context where the life of a patient
is at stake. In the event that a patient is unable to make a decision for themselves due to illness or
injury, medical decisions are often made by a surrogate in cases where the patient has not made
a legally binding advance directive1. In the United States for example, family members are often
burdened with making decisions in the intensive care unit, where only about 5% of patients are
deemed able to make decisions for themselves (Radwany et al., 2009). If knowledge of the patient’s
wishes is available, the surrogate is instructed to make a decision that follows the substituted
judgment standard – i.e., make the decision the recipient would have made for themselves, thereby
putting aside their own wishes and preferences for the patient. On the other hand, in the absence of
information about a patient’s wishes, the best interests standard is followed – i.e., the best possible
1The specific instances and circumstances in which surrogate decisions are made vary depending on a country’s legislation,
thereby making more or less common from one country to the next.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2019 | Volume 10 | Article 79
fpsyg-10-00079 February 6, 2019 Time: 23:19 # 2
Batteux et al. Accountability and Surrogate Decision-Making
outcome that provides the most benefit for the patient. Are
surrogates able to take decisions that accurately represents the
recipient’s wishes and preferences, or are they influenced by
other factors?
Qualitative research highlights that surrogates feel conflicted
between making a decision that reflects the patient’s wishes
and factors such as preserving the patient’s life or the family’s
well-being (Schenker et al., 2012; Dionne-Odom et al., 2015;
Fetherstonhaugh et al., 2017). In terms of whether surrogates
are actually capable of predicting their next-of-kin’s treatment
preferences, a systematic review showed that they were accurate
only 68% of the time (Shalowitz et al., 2006). Interestingly,
it seems that surrogates are biased toward predicting that a
patient would want to be treated and are therefore more accurate
in cases where the patients are favorable to treatment (Frey
et al., 2014). Moreover, surrogates seem to have preferences
regarding the procedure that should be followed when making
a surrogate decision, which might in turn affect whether the
substituted judgment is adequately followed (Frey et al., 2018).
Taken together, these findings show that the substituted judgment
standard is unlikely to be met in most cases, thereby adding to
the debate concerning its suitability (Torke et al., 2008). What
about the cases where surrogates do not know the wishes of the
patient? In this paper, we theorize that the accountability placed
on a surrogate will come into play and explore its influence on
surrogate decisions in treatment scenarios involving risk.
For the purpose of this paper, we adopt a rather broad
definition of accountability which refers to the answerability a
decision-maker has – i.e., the responsibility for justifying their
decisions. Accountability can manifest itself in a number of more
specific ways. From a legal perspective, accountability would refer
to being answerable to a court of law in the event that the
decision-maker is accused of making an incriminating decision.
This would presumably push the decision-maker toward making
a decision that would not incriminate them. The decision-maker
can also be held accountable in a more indirect manner – by
the recipient themselves or the recipient’s family for the harmful
consequences of the decision. It is conceivable that this would
push the decision-maker toward an empathic response that aims
to minimize potential harm to the recipient and their family. We
aim to investigate how consideration of these factors influences
surrogate treatment decisions.
When doctors are faced with hypothetical scenarios in which
they have to make treatment decisions or recommendations
for their patients, research shows that they accept less risk
for their patient than they do for themselves (Ubel et al.,
2011; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2012a; Janssen et al., 2015).
Ubel et al. (2011) argue that these differences arise due to
an effect of accountability whereby physicians feel the need
to be able to justify their choices to others. Garcia-Retamero
and Galesic (2012a) showed that doctors report that they
fear the legal consequences of their decisions and thereby
reduce the risk they are prepared to take for a patient relative
to themselves. They also found that doctors did not make
decisions that were in line with their predictions of the patient’s
risk preferences. These results highlight the role accountability
plays in the way doctors reduce their risk-taking for their
patients relative to themselves, which is not surprising given
that litigation against medical professionals is on the rise
(Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2012b).
However, this reduction in risk-taking is not exclusive to
doctors. It has also been found when people from the general
population make decisions for a hypothetical patient (Zikmund-
Fisher et al., 2006; Oliver, 2013), a family member (Zikmund-
Fisher et al., 2006; Petrova et al., 2016; Tang et al., 2016; Carroll
et al., 2017) or a stranger (Batteux et al., unpublished). This
has been interpreted as surrogates being more cautious when
deciding for someone else (Oliver, 2013), as well as stemming
from the need to justify one’s decisions (Zikmund-Fisher et al.,
2006), in which case maximizing survival chances is easier to
defend. It has also been shown that this reduction in risk-taking
is apparent even when it goes against the recipient’s preferences
(Petrova et al., 2016). Overall, it seems that this effect occurs
regardless of the identity of both the decision-maker and the
recipient. Even though professional accountability is not relevant
in the case of ordinary decision-makers, it is plausible that some
other form of accountability is responsible for the reduction in
risk-taking, such as the responsibility the decision-maker has
toward the recipient and their family to make a well-founded
decision. In fact, similar accounts have been put forward when
discussing the discrepancies between our own choices and our
advice to others – we are more cautious when advising others to
avoid being responsible for their loss (Dana and Cain, 2015). Our
aim here is to explore the role accountability plays when ordinary
decision-makers make surrogate treatment choices.
Past research has often focused on scenarios that speak of
the possibility of the patient dying, either without treatment
(Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2006; Ubel et al., 2011; Garcia-Retamero
and Galesic, 2012b; Oliver, 2013; Tang et al., 2016) or as a
consequence of treatment (Ubel et al., 2011; Carroll et al.,
2017; Batteux et al., unpublished). Crucially, in all of these
cases surrogate decisions were directed toward the option that
reduced the patient’s likelihood of dying. Wanting to preserve
the patient’s life and give them a chance is clearly apparent in
qualitative reports by surrogates (Schenker et al., 2012; Dionne-
Odom et al., 2015; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 2017). This often
constitutes the reason why surrogates have such a difficult time
deciding and might be prevented from acting in accordance
with the recipient’s values. We therefore hypothesize that self-
other differences are driven by the wish to increase the patient’s
likelihood of survival, over and above other potential costs (such
as diminished quality of life). For that reason, we expect that
accountability pushes surrogates toward making a decision that
preserves the patient’s life.
The predictions made regarding accountability are supported
by current theories of surrogate decision-making. Tunney and
Ziegler’s (2015) model proposes that surrogate decisions are the
result of perspective taking that varies according to the features
of the decision. In the context of medical decisions, a next-of-
kin might engage in a simulated perspective, thereby making
the decision the patient would have wanted (i.e., follow the
substituted judgment standard), whereas a doctor might adopt
a more benevolent perspective and make a decision that is in
the patient’s best interest (i.e., follow the best-interests standard).
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On the other hand, the accountability held against the decision-
maker is likely to also make them engage in an egocentric
perspective where they consider what is best for themselves,
which might prevent them from making a simulated or a
benevolent decision. Medical professionals might do this if they
fear the professional or legal consequences of making the wrong
decision, in which case it would be easier for them to justify a
decision that is aimed at saving lives. Ordinary decision-makers
might adopt an egocentric perspective if they fear going against
the family’s wishes, even if that might mean overriding what the
patient would want. This coincides with qualitative reports which
show that surrogate decision-makers struggle to reconcile the
family’s wishes with what the patient would want (Schenker et al.,
2012; Dionne-Odom et al., 2015; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 2017).
Additionally, Social Values Theory (Stone and Allgaier, 2008)
proposes that surrogate decisions are made according to the
social value placed on taking or avoiding a risk. It has indeed
been found that surrogate health and safety decisions are made
in line with what people perceive to be a socially acceptable level
of risk-taking (Stone et al., 2013). If taking risks in a medical
setting is frowned upon, it makes sense that surrogates would
want to minimize risk-taking to avoid being blamed for the
negative consequences of their decision, and it is even more likely
that surrogates take this into account when held accountable for
their decision.
In this study, we examined the hypothesis that once we make
the accountability for the negative consequences of taking a risk
(i.e., death) salient, decision-makers reduce their risk-taking for
others relative to themselves. Although the literature discusses
findings in this way, this interpretation has not been formally
tested with ordinary decision-makers. Specifically, we want to
understand whether the self-other differences that have been
reported have arisen due to surrogates thinking about their own
accountability. We theorized that there might be two different
sources of accountability that have an impact on surrogate risk-
taking: the recipient’s family and the potential legal implications
of making a decision that threatens a patient’s life. In doing
so, we can assess whether the fear of legal repercussions is also
relevant to ordinary decision-makers. Given that we expect that
the main source of accountability experienced by surrogates
relates to the recipient’s survival, we focused our accountability
manipulation on the eventuality that the decision leads to the
death of the recipient.
We tested the impact that accountability salience can have
on risk-taking by manipulating the information we presented
to participants when making their surrogate decisions. We
predict that making these accountability factors more salient to
participants will further decrease their risk-taking. To assess self-
other differences in choices, we used the QALY (quality-adjusted
life years) standard gamble (SG) method commonly used to
measure the utility of health states (Whitehead and Ali, 2010).
It measures utility under risk for a particular medical condition
by presenting a choice between a safe option2 (staying in that
2Although we label this option the “safe” option to distinguish it from the “risky”
option in our study, the “safe” option can be thought of as carrying risks as well,
which we will address in our discussion.
condition) and a risky option (taking a risky treatment which
could lead to the death of the patient). We used both relatively
minor and severe illnesses to investigate whether accountability
salience had the same effect on both.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Design
A 2 (Recipient) × 2 (Magnitude) × 3 (Accountability) mixed
design was used. “Recipient” was a within-subjects factor
where participants made decisions for themselves (self) and
for another participant (other). “Magnitude” was a within-
subjects factor relating to the severity of the health state.
“Accountability” was a between-subjects factor which refers to
how accountability was made salient to participants (control,
family, legal).
Participants
Participants (n = 86) were recruited from the University of
Nottingham. Two participants were excluded because they did
not understand the task (one misinterpreted the choices and the
other repeatedly pressed the wrong keys). The sample size was
determined using G∗Power 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007). We expected
an interaction between recipient and accountability. Given that
this is the first study to test the effects of accountability on self-
other differences in medical decisions, we could not compute an
effect size based on previous research and therefore theorized
that we would find a small to medium effect size. A sample
size of 84 enables the detection of a small to medium effect
size (d = 0.35) with adequate power (>0.80) and an acceptable
alpha level (<0.05). The age group ranged from 18 to 34
(M = 20.65, SD = 3.31). There were 21 males and 65 females.
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Nottingham
ethics committee.
Choice Task
Participants completed the experiment on a computer using
PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). They were presented with six illness
scenarios (three large magnitude scenarios and three small
magnitude scenarios, see Appendix 1). The order in which
they were presented these scenarios was randomized. Each
participant completed each scenario twice: once for themselves
and once deciding for another unknown participant. The order
in which they were presented with each recipient condition was
counterbalanced across participants. They were told that the
other participant was a student of a similar age and situation to
them. Participants were given the choice between a safe option:
remaining in a condition (paraplegia, Broca’s aphasia, vegetative
state, angina, headache, nausea) and a risky option: a treatment
with a probability p of a complete recovery and a probability 1 –
p of death. The probability p in the risky option was presented
in descending order (100, 95, 90, 80, 70, 60, 50, 40, 30, 20, 10,
5, and 0%) until respondents switched from choosing the risky
option to the safe option. Instructions and example trials can be
found in Appendix 1.
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Accountability Salience
In the family accountability condition, participants were asked
to think about the recipient’s family: “In the event of that
person’s death, their family will be devastated. Consider how the
family would feel and think carefully about the consequences
your choice would have for them before you make it.” In the
legal accountability condition, participants were told what the
legal consequences of their decision might be: “In the event
of that person’s death, you will be held legally responsible
for it. If you are able to justify your choice, you will not be
prosecuted. Think carefully about your choice before you make
it.” In the control condition, participants were not provided
with additional information or instructions. Accountability was
only made salient to participants in the other condition, not
in the self-condition.
Manipulation Checks
In order to check whether making accountability salient had an
effect, all participants were presented with two questions relating
to their surrogate choices at the end of the task. One asked
whether they thought of the consequences the recipient’s death
might have for their family, and the other whether they thought
of the legal consequences that the recipient’s death might have for
them. Participants responded on a 5-point Likert scale (1 being
“not at all” and 5 being “a great deal”).
RESULTS
In line with previous literature, we computed participants’
utilities of the medical scenario for each recipient (Whitehead
and Ali, 2010). We did so by taking their indifference point
between taking the risky option and the safe option. The
indifference point is the average of the two probabilities each
side of the crossover point from the risky to the safe option.
Utilities varied between 0 and 1 where 0 indicates that they
always chose the risky option and 1 indicates they always chose
the sure option. We then averaged utilities for large magnitude
scenarios and small magnitude scenarios to have an overall
utility for each condition. The utilities for each recipient and
outcome magnitude can be found in Table 1 by accountability
salience condition. We checked whether these utilities were
normally distributed and met the criteria to be entered in
an analysis of variance (ANOVA). Their distribution can be
found in Appendix 1.
TABLE 1 | Mean utilities with standard deviations across participants for each
recipient and outcome magnitude by accountability salience condition.
Self Other
Large Small Large Small
Control 0.55 (0.19) 0.76 (0.17) 0.67 (0.19) 0.78 (0.17)
Family 0.46 (0.20) 0.73 (0.17) 0.63 (0.18) 0.78 (0.17)
Legal 0.47 (0.21) 0.70 (0.19) 0.62 (0.19) 0.76 (0.16)
FIGURE 1 | Self-other differences for each outcome magnitude per condition,
with error bars indicating 95% confidence intervals. Negative values indicate
that participants took more risk for themselves than for someone else.
We entered these utilities in a 2 (Recipient) × 2
(Magnitude) × 3 (Accountability) mixed model ANOVA
where recipient (self, other) and outcome magnitude (large,
small) were within-subject factors and accountability (control,
family, legal) was a between-subject factor. There was a main
effect of recipient: participants were more risk-averse for
someone else than for themselves (F1,81 = 41.90, MSE = 0.02,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.341). There was a main effect of magnitude:
participants were more risk-averse for small than for large
magnitudes (F1,81 = 149.95, MSE = 0.02, p< 0.001, ηp2 = 0.649).
There was also an interaction between recipient and magnitude
(F1,81 = 52.731, MSE = 0.01, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.405): self-
other differences were greater with large magnitudes (mean
difference = –0.150, p < 0.001) than with small magnitudes
(mean difference = –0.037, p = 0.010) according to a simple
effects analysis. However, there were no interactions with
accountability salience. Figure 1 shows the self-other difference
for each outcome magnitude per condition.
To check for any order effects relating to the recipient
condition, we ran the analysis again with the order factor (self-
other, other-self). The above results remained the same, with
the addition of an interaction between recipient and order
(F1,78 = 8.385, MSE = 0.017, p = 0.005, ηp2 = 0.097). According
to a simple effects analysis, self-other differences were larger
when the self-condition was completed first (mean difference =
–0.133, p < 0.001) rather than the other condition completed
first (mean difference = –0.052, p = 0.011). This reinforces
the need for conditions to be counterbalanced to control for
order effects.
To further investigate the null effect of accountability salience,
we conducted a Bayesian mixed model ANOVA. We did not find
evidence for an effect of accountability salience. Full details of
these results can be found in Appendix 1.
The manipulation checks showed that participants in each
condition thought about different factors when making the
surrogate decision (see Figure 2). Participants’ responses were
entered in a 2 (Factor) × 3 (Accountability) mixed model
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FIGURE 2 | Participants’ reports of how much they thought about the
recipient’s family and legal consequences while making a surrogate choice.
Higher values indicate that participants thought about a particular factor to a
greater extent. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
ANOVA. There was a main effect of factor: participants
reported thinking more about the recipient’s family than
about legal consequences (F1,79 = 13.99, MSE = 1.35,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.150). There was also an interaction
between factor and accountability condition (F1,79 = 23.706,
MSE = 1.35, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.375). According to simple
effects analyses, participants in the control condition thought
more about the recipient’s family than legal consequences
(mean difference = 1.407, p < 0.001), as did participants in
the family condition (mean difference = 1.704, p < 0.001).
Participants in the legal condition, however, thought more
about legal consequences than the recipient’s family (mean
difference = 1.071, p = 0.004).
We investigated whether there was a relationship between
self-other differences overall and self-reports of the extent to
which participants thought about a particular factor using
Pearson’s correlations. There was no relationship between the
family factor and self-other differences (r = 0.014, p = 0.903),
which would make sense if people were also thinking about
their families when deciding for themselves. On the other
hand, there was a positive relationship between the legal
factor and self-other differences (r = 0.248, p = 0.025), which
again would make sense given that legal responsibilities would
not apply when making decisions for oneself. It seems that
thinking about legal consequences decreases risk-taking for other
relative to the self.
DISCUSSION
Surrogates were less willing to accept a treatment that carried
a risk of dying for another person as they did for themselves.
This is consistent with the literature which has found that
surrogates are more likely to make choices that avoid a
risk of death for others than for themselves (Zikmund-Fisher
et al., 2006; Ubel et al., 2011; Garcia-Retamero and Galesic,
2012a; Oliver, 2013; Petrova et al., 2016). These findings
support accounts of self-other differences based on caution due
to the responsibility placed on the decision-maker, but also
given the uncertainty contained in deciding in the absence
of knowledge of the recipient’s preferences in our study.
Notably, we found that self-other differences held across both
magnitudes, meaning that decision-makers reduced their risk-
taking for others both when considering minor and severe
illness scenarios.
Our findings suggest that the accountability manipulation
did not significantly affect surrogate’s propensity to accept the
risky treatment, even though the manipulation checks show
that it did have an effect on participants’ thought process.
It seems that in the family condition, participants’ attention
was guided toward thinking about a factor that those in the
control condition considered anyway, but that participants in
the legal condition were steered away from it and toward a
different factor. Our assumption here was that by emphasizing
to participants the factors that we expect drive self-other
differences, this would further decrease surrogate risk-taking.
Our prediction was not supported in our main analysis, although
we do observe a trend which indicates that it might have been
detected as a small effect in a higher powered study. We also
found tentative evidence which does not exclude the possibility
that accountability influences self-other differences. The more
participants reported thinking about legal consequences, the
more likely they were to reduce their risk-taking for the
recipient relative to themselves. However, participants in both
the control and family condition do not seem to take legal
consequences into much consideration, meaning that self-other
differences in those groups cannot be explained by that. On the
other hand, they both report taking the recipient’s family into
consideration. The fact that participants in the control group
spontaneously thought about the family factor suggests that it
could be responsible for the reduction in risk-taking observed
in the literature that is not specific to doctors, rather than any
legal consequences.
Interestingly, we found a discrepancy between the thoughts
our participants and doctors spontaneously report, even though
in both cases thinking about legal repercussions seems to reduce
risk-taking (Garcia-Retamero and Galesic, 2012b). Contrary
to the case of doctors, our participants did not seem to
take the legal consequences into much consideration, which
makes sense given the strong professional responsibilities
that affect doctors. However, we still find similar self-other
differences, which suggests that multiple factors lead to
a reduction in risk-taking. This could be indicative of a
strong norm for taking less risk for others in a medical
context and lends support to the idea that these decisions
are made according to the social value placed on risk-
taking (Stone and Allgaier, 2008). Moreover, if accountability
drives these self-other differences, it is conceivable that it
is in fact the social norm which is steering the effect of
accountability. Given that we define accountability as the
need to justify one’s decisions to others, it would make
sense to rely on a social norm to do so. In the case of
doctors for example, they might rely on the social norm
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that they are expected to save lives. The influence of
social norms on the effect of accountability on self-other
differences is an interesting empirical question which remains
open to investigation.
It is important to note that we conceptualized risk-taking
in this study as the option that carries the risk of the
recipient dying. However, refusing treatment is also an option
that carries a risk – i.e., remaining ill might lead to harm
further down the line. Although the scenarios specifically laid
out the symptoms and living conditions associated with the
illness, it is conceivable that participants also considered the
safer option to be risky. Relatedly, this could mean that they
would also feel accountable for not taking the treatment and
leaving the recipient with the illness. The fact that risk presents
itself in both the safe and risky options, favoring the safe
option might simply mean that participants are avoiding the
risk of dying, rather than being risk-averse. Considering that
participants chose the status quo (i.e., the safe option) for
someone else more often than for themselves, this shows further
support for our hypothesis that surrogates favor the option that
maximizes the recipient’s survival regardless of whether this
entails taking or avoiding treatment. This is consistent with
previous research that shows that doctors are more likely to
take a treatment with a higher risk of death but a lower risk
of complications for themselves than they are for a patient
(Ubel et al., 2011). In light of this, self-other differences in
treatment scenarios could be reinterpreted as surrogates being
more likely to favor life preservation for others, at the expense
of their quality of life, than they are for themselves. In that
case, decisions might not be consistently less risk-taking for
others, but instead seek the option that prevents the risk of the
recipient dying.
Relatedly, by making the treatment option the risky option
and the status quo the safe option, we introduced a confound.
Perhaps participants were more likely to choose the status quo
for others rather than more likely to choose the safer option,
out of fear of being accountable for interfering with the natural
course of events for example. However, studies that made the
treatment option the safe option and the status quo the risky
option also found that participants favored the safe option for
others (Zikmund-Fisher et al., 2006; Ubel et al., 2011; Petrova
et al., 2016; Tang et al., 2016). This sheds light on the confound
in the present study and suggests that the explanation we propose
holds for cases where the risky option is either taking or refusing
treatment. Furthermore, it is possible that the design of our
experiment encouraged risk-seeking behavior by making the
treatment option the default option (which starts out as being a
safe option with no risk of death)3. Indeed, the default literature
would predict that people are more likely to stick to the default
option (Johnson and Goldstein, 2003). This should not have
impacted self-other differences unless decision-makers are less
likely to stick to the default option for others, which is an
interesting question for the wider decision-making literature.
3We included this trial to check that participants were paying attention and
responding honestly, under the assumption that they would take a treatment which
lead to a full recovery. Note that participants always selected that option so we did
not exclude any on that basis.
Finally, future studies should keep in mind that it might be more
ecologically valid to have the status quo as the default option as
opposed to the treatment.
Avenues for Future Research
Crucially, what we did not measure here was the participants’
feelings of accountability, both in terms of their own guilt
and responsibility and their fear of the potential repercussions
for them. It is conceivable that it is the emotional response
to thinking about these factors that drives the reduction in
surrogate risk-taking, rather than the mere fact that participants
consider them. Perhaps most participants would think about
these factors, but not all would be swayed by them when making
their decision. Moreover, making accountability salient did not
alter the specific scenarios but rather pushed participants to
think about their accountability as the decision-maker. Perhaps
a more effective way of testing the effect of accountability
would be to compare scenarios that include elements that
specifically increase the accountability held against the decision-
maker (e.g., the decision-maker is convicted if the recipient
dies) or decrease it (e.g., the decision-maker is guaranteed
anonymity). Finding more sophisticated ways of assessing
accountability is an important step for future research to
understand its role.
Investigating an unknown other as the recipient allows
investigation of cases where the surrogate has to decide in the
absence of information about the recipient’s wishes. Nevertheless,
it would be worth investigating whether the thought process
changes when the surrogate is aware of the patient’s wishes.
Perhaps feelings of accountability diminish when the patient’s
wishes are clear and respected by the surrogate. Given that the
surrogate would not know the wishes of the recipient’s family
either, it remains open to question whether they conceptualized
the wishes of the family to be different to what we emphasized
to them in the scenarios. It would be interesting to investigate
whether surrogates would hold different assumptions concerning
the wishes of a patient’s family.
CONCLUSION
We found that participants were more likely to refuse a treatment
that carries a risk of death for someone else than for themselves,
therefore implying that they would rather leave them ill than
risk their death. It is conceivable that previous findings can be
reinterpreted as surrogates favoring saving lives for others more
so than for themselves, rather than necessarily taking more risks
for themselves than for others. We explored the idea that this was
due to participants being driven by the thought of being held
accountable in the event of the recipient’s death. Our findings
show tentative evidence that thinking about accountability steers
surrogates away from risking the recipient’s life, but further
research is necessary. However, we did find that participants
considered the repercussions for the recipient’s family, and at
times legal repercussions when making a surrogate decision.
This suggests that participants are considering multiple factors,
although it is still unclear how they affect the decisions they make.
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These findings can speak to the reality of surrogate decision-
making, which often involves a struggle to reconcile the
patient’s wishes with a multitude of other perspectives and
responsibilities (Schenker et al., 2012; Dionne-Odom et al.,
2015; Fetherstonhaugh et al., 2017). This supports the idea
that a surrogate decision involves a lot more than fulfilling
the substituted judgment standard. Asking surrogates to put
themselves and the recipient’s family aside appears to be an
unrealistic expectation.
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